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A moment constraint that limits the number of dividends in the optimal
dividend problem is suggested. This leads to a new type of time-inconsistent
stochastic impulse control problem. First, the optimal solution in the precom-
mitment sense is derived. Second, the problem is formulated as an intraper-
sonal sequential dynamic game in line with Strotz’ consistent planning. In
particular, the notions of pure dividend strategies and a (strong) subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium are adapted. An equilibrium is derived using a smooth
fit condition. The equilibrium is shown to be strong. The uncontrolled state
process is a fairly general diffusion.
Keywords: Constrained stochastic control, Optimal dividend problem, Stochastic im-
pulse control, Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Time-inconsistency.
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1. Introduction
We consider a family of filtered probability spaces (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,Px), x ∈ R, satisfying
the usual conditions and a one-dimensional processX = (Xt)t≥0 given under Px by
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt − dDt, X0 = x a.s. (1.1)
where D = (Dt)t≥0 is a non-decreasing adapted process andW = (Wt)t≥0 is a Wiener
process. The associated expectations are denoted by Ex. The classical optimal dividend
problem in this setting is to suppose that the owner of an insurance companywith surplus
processX chooses the dividend policyD that maximizes the sum of discounted dividend
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payments until bankruptcy. Specifically, the owner considers the stochastic control prob-
lem
U(x) := sup
D∈A(x)
J(x;D), J(x;D) := Ex
(∫ τ
0
e−rtdDt
)
,
τ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ 0},
(1.2)
where τ is interpreted as the bankruptcy time, r > 0 is a discount factor and
D ∈ A(x) if D is a LCRL non-decreasing adapted process withD0 = 0
such thatXτ+ ≥ 0.
Problem (1.2) was first studied in [42] where — under certain conditions for the functions
µ(·) and σ(·); notably, µ′(x) ≤ r for all x ≥ 0 — it was found that if an optimal policy
exists then it is to pay dividends only in order to reflect the processX at a barrier x∗ and
if no optimal policy exists then the optimal value function U(x) is the limit of the value
function given a reflecting barrier dividend policy when sending the barrier to infinity.
A criticism of this formulation of the dividend problem from an economic viewpoint is
that the solution involves an unreasonably high number of dividend payments; in partic-
ular, once X reaches the barrier x∗ an infinite number of dividends will be paid during
any immediately following time interval no matter how small. One way of taking this
criticism into account is to introduce a fixed cost for each dividend payment, which ob-
viously limits the optimal number of dividend payments and thus leads to a stochastic
impulse control problem. In the present paper we instead introduce a moment constraint
that more directly limits the number of dividend payments. Specifically, if we denote by
τn the timing of the n:th dividend payment for a discrete dividend policyD, thenD is in
the present paper said to be admissible for a given initial surplus x ≥ 0 in (1.1), which we
write asD ∈ A(x, k), ifD ∈ A(x) and the moment constraint Ex
(∑
n:τn≤τ
e−rτn
)
≤ 1
k
is satisfied, where k > 0 is a fixed parameter. Clearly, a dividend policy satisfying the
moment constraint must be of impulse control type; in particular, an admissible dividend
policyD ∈ A(x, k) can be represented as
Dt =
∑
n:τn<t
ζn, t ≥ 0 withD0 = 0, where, for each n = 1, 2...,
τn ≥ 0 is an (Ft)t≥0-stopping time such that τn+1 > τn on {τn <∞}
and ζn is an Fτn-measurable random variable with 0 < ζn ≤ Xτn a.s.,
and τn →∞ a.s. n→∞.
(1.3)
Note also that ζn = Xτn −Xτn+. The interpretation of ζn is that it is the n:th dividend
payment. In the sequel we denote a dividend policy of impulse control type as defined
in (1.3) by S = (τn, ζn)n≥1 — which means, using a slight abuse of notation, that S =
(τn, ζn)n≥1 ∈ A(x) for each x ≥ 0 by definition — and for ease of exposition we restate
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the moment constraint as
R(x;S) := Ex

 ∑
n:τn≤τ
e−rτn

 ≤ 1
k
, where k > 0 is fixed. (MC)
This implies that
S = (τn, ζn)n≥1 ∈ A(x; k) if (MC) holds.
The objective of the present paper is to study the problem of maximizing the sum of
expected discounted dividends over the set of admissible dividend policiesA(x; k), i.e. in
particular under the constraint (MC). It turns out that this problem is time-inconsistent in
the sense that a dividend policy which is, in the precommitment sense, optimal at time 0
will not generally be optimal at a time t > 0 when considering the constraint (MC) using
the value for the state process at t, see Remark 3.5. We remark that it could be argued that
it would be more reasonable to call this problem space-inconsistent but we have chosen to
use the more established term. The main contribution of the present paper is to formulate
and solve this problem both in the precommitment sense and in the game-theoretic sense
of Strotz’ consistent planning. The present paper is, to our knowledge, the first to study
a stochastic control problem that is time-inconsistent due to a constraint using the game-
theoretic approach and we note that it seems likely that there are many other interesting
constrained stochastic control problems that can be formulated and solved along the lines
of the present paper.
An interpretation of the constraint (MC) is that the company wants to limit the number
of dividend payments not mainly due to financial costs of paying dividends but rather be-
cause a high number of dividend payments is undesirable for other reasons; for example
because the financial market expects a limited number of dividend payments, or because
they involve tedious administrative work for the decision maker. Note that 1
k
can be in-
terpreted as the maximum number of expected dividends to be paid until an independent
exponential time with expectation 1
r
.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.1 mentions related literature. In
Section 2 the model of the present paper is formulated in more detail and some results
that will be used in the sequel are presented. In Section 3 the precommitment interpre-
tation of the constrained dividend problem is formulated and solved; and properties of
the solution are investigated. These results rely on the solution to the (unconstrained)
optimal dividend problem under the assumption that a fixed cost is incurred for each div-
idend payment, which is therefore also recapitulated and studied in Section 3. In Section
4 we formulate and solve the constrained dividend problem as a game along the lines of
Strotz’ consistent planning. An equilibrium is derived using a smooth fit condition. The
equilibrium is shown to be strong and its properties are investigated. A discussion of our
equilibrium definition is found in Section 4.1. An example is studied in Section 5. Model
assumptions are discussed in Appendix A. Most proofs are found in Appendix B.
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1.1. Background and related literature
Th study of time-inconsistent control problems goes back to a seminal paper by Strotz [43]
in the 1950s, but the field has experienced a considerable activity during the last years.
Time-inconsistency in stochastic control typically arises due to the consideration of (1)
non-exponential discounting, (2) a state-dependent reward function, or (3) nonlinearities
in the expected reward, e.g. mean-variance utility; see e.g. [13, 19, 20, 31] for descriptions
of these kinds of problems and references. Time-inconsistency is typically studied using
the precommitment approach, which means finding an optimal control policy for a given
initial value of the controlled process, or the time-consistent (game-theoretic) approach
along the lines of Strotz’ invention. Time-inconsistency can also be studied using the
notion of dynamic optimality, see [39, 40].
The game-theoretic approach is to interpret a time-inconsistent problem as an intrap-
ersonal sequential dynamic game. The approach is formalized by defining a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium suitable for the particular problem at hand. See Section 4.1
for an interpretation of the game in the present paper and Section 4 for our equilibrium
definition. A main reference for the general theory of the game-theoretic approach to
time-inconsistent stochastic control is [12]. A large literature studying particular time-
inconsistent problems using the game-theoretic approach has evolved during the last
years; a short recent survey is contained in [31]. The general theory of time-inconsistent
stopping is studied in e.g. [19, 20, 27].
The present paper is different from most papers on time-inconsistent control in the sense
that the time-inconsistency does not arise due to the factors (1)–(3) mentioned above;
instead it is due to the consideration of a constraint for an otherwise time-consistent
stochastic control problem. While we believe, as mentioned above, that the present paper
is the first to consider the game-theoretic approach to a problem that is time-inconsistent
for this reason there are many papers that study stochastic control under different kinds
of constraints and we here only mention a few. Optimal dividends under ruin probabil-
ity constraints are studied in [23, 26], while optimal dividends under a constraint for the
ruin time is studied in [25]. A dividend problem under the constraint that the surplus
process must be above a given fixed level in order for dividend payments to be admissible
is studied in [36]; see also [32] where this problem is studied in a model which allows
for capital injection. Optimal stopping under expectation constraints is studied in [3, 9]
while stochastic control under expectation constraints is studied in [44]. Distribution-
constrained optimal stopping is studied in [8, 10]. It should also be mentioned that mean-
variance problems are sometimes formulated as constrained optimization problems. For
example, constrained mean-variance portfolio selection (a control problem) is studied in
[40] and constrained mean-variance selling strategies (a stopping problem) are studied in
[39], although the main topic of these papers is the notion of dynamic optimality. In [38] a
constrained portfolio selection problem is investigated using the dynamic optimality ap-
proach and a comparison is made to the precommitment approach. The game-theoretic
approach to a mean-variance optimization problem under the constraint of no short sell-
ing is studied in [11]. We also mention [33] in which a conditional optimal stopping
problem is studied using a game-theoretic approach.
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Time-inconsistent dividend problems have been studied before: The optimal dividend
problem under non-exponential discounting is studied using the game-theoretic approach
in [14, 15, 17, 30, 45, 46], while [16] studies this problem incorporating also capital injec-
tions.
The precommitment approach of the present paper relies, as we have mentioned, on re-
sults for the fixed cost dividend problem. This problem was first studied in [29] which
considers a Wiener process with drift and later in [37] where a more general diffusion
model is considered; see Remarks 3.9 and 3.10 and Appendix A for further references.
There is a vast literature on many different versions of the optimal dividend problem, see
e.g. the literature reviews [1, 4] and the more recent surveys included in [22, 24, 32].
2. Model formulation and preliminaries
In this section we specify model assumptions and present results and notation on which
the subsequent analysis relies. Unless otherwise stated we assume throughout the paper
that all items in Assumption 2.1 below hold; see Appendix A for a discussion of Assump-
tion 2.1.
Assumption 2.1.
(A.1) µ(·) and σ(·) are continuously differentiable and Lipschitz continous, and µ′(·) and
σ′(·) are Lipschitz continous.
(A.2) σ2(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0.
(A.3) µ′(x) < r for all x ≥ 0 (recall that r > 0 is the discount rate).
(A.4) An ε > 0 and an xa ≥ 0 such that µ
′(x) < r − ε for all x ≥ xa exist.
(A.5) µ(0) > 0.
(Note that (A.3) and (A.4) are, given that (A.1) holds, equivalent to the condition that
there exists an ε > 0 such that µ′(x) < r− ε for all x ≥ 0.) Consider the boundary value
problem
AXg(x) := µ(x)g
′(x) +
1
2
σ2(x)g′′(x) = rg(x), x > 0 (2.1)
g′(0) > 0, g(0) = 0, g(·) ∈ C2(0,∞). (2.2)
Lemma 2.2. Suppose (A.1)–(A.2) hold. Then, a solution g(·) of (2.1)–(2.2) that is unique up
to multiplication of a positive constant exists (and is in the sequel called a canonical solution).
Moreover:
(i) g(·) ∈ C3(0,∞) and g′′′(·) is Lipschitz continous.
(ii) Adding (A.3) implies that g′(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0.
(iii) Adding (A.3)–(A.4) implies that limx→∞ g
′(x) =∞.
(iv) Adding (A.3)–(A.5) implies that a unique xb ∈ (0,∞) such that g
′′(xb) = 0, g
′′(x) <
0 for x < xb and g
′′(x) > 0 for x > xb exists.
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It will in the sections below be shown that both the precommitment and the equilibrium
solutions (to be defined) are of the following kind:
Definition 2.3. A dividend policy of impulse control type S = (τn, ζn)n≥1, see (1.3), is
said to be a constant lump sum dividend barrier policy if:
• Each dividend is of the same size, i.e.
ζn = x¯− x, for some x¯ > x ≥ 0,
except possibly at time 0 when a dividend of size x− x is paid if x ≥ x¯.
• A dividend is paid when the processX reaches a fixed level, i.e.
τ1 = inf{t > 0 : Xt ≥ x¯}, τn = inf{t > τn−1 : Xt ≥ x¯}, n = 2, 3...
(we use the convention inf ∅ =∞).
In the sequel we will in the case of a dividend policy of impulse control type S =
(τn, ζn)n≥1 write the corresponding value function, cf. (1.2) and (1.3), as
J(x;S) = Ex

 ∑
n:τn≤τ
e−rτnζn

 . (2.3)
Moreover, with a slight abuse of notationwe denote a constant lump sum dividend barrier
policy S by (x, x¯) and write the corresponding value function (2.3) as J(x;x, x¯), and
similarly for e.g. the function R(x;S) defined in (MC). We will use the following results.
Proposition 2.4. Consider an arbitrary constant lump sum dividend barrier policy (x, x¯).
The corresponding value function J(x;S) is then continous and can be written as
J(x;x, x¯) =
{
J0(x;x, x¯) := g(x) x¯−x
g(x¯)−g(x) , 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯,
x− x+ J0(x;x, x¯), x > x¯.
(2.4)
Moreover, the corresponding function R(x;S) defined in (MC) is continous and can be writ-
ten as
R(x;x, x¯) =
{
R0(x;x, x¯) := g(x) 1
g(x¯)−g(x) , 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯,
1 +R0(x;x, x¯), x > x¯.
(2.5)
Lemma 2.5.
(i) Consider an arbitrary initial surplus x > 0. Then, R(x;x, x¯) is continous and strictly
decreasing in x¯ with limx¯→∞R(x;x, x¯) = 0 for any fixed x ≥ 0. Moreover,
R(x;x, x¯) is continous and strictly increasing in x with limx→x¯R(x;x, x¯) = ∞
for any fixed x¯ > 0.
(ii) R(x¯;x, x¯) is continous and strictly decreasing in x¯ with limx¯→∞R(x¯;x, x¯) = 1 for
any fixed x > 0. R (x¯; 0, x¯) = 1 for any fixed x¯ > 0.
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In Sections 3 and 4 it will be shown that if we let the moment constraint (MC) vanish
in the sense of sending k → 0 then the precommitment and equilibrium solutions both
converge to the solution of the classical dividend problem (1.2); see Corollary 3.7 and
Theorem 4.9, respectively. For the convenience of the reader we therefore include the
following result which follows directly from [42, Theorem 4.3] and Lemma 2.2.
Proposition 2.6. The optimal dividend policy for the unconstrained problem (1.2) reflects
the state process (1.1) at the barrier
x∗ := xb (2.6)
(where xb is defined in Lemma 2.2) while being flat off {t ≥ 0 : Xt = x
∗}; where it shall be
understood that if the initial surplus satisfies x > x∗ then there is an immediate dividend
payment of size x− x∗. The optimal value function is
U(x) =
{
g(x)
g′(x∗) , 0 ≤ x ≤ x
∗,
x− x∗ + U (x∗) , x > x∗.
(2.7)
Remark 2.7. [42, Theorem 4.3] presents the solution to problem (1.2) under, essentially,
(A.1)–(A.2) and the following relaxed version of (A.3):
µ′(x) ≤ r for all x ≥ 0. (A.3’)
In particular it, essentially, says that: if xb = 0 (which is equivalent to µ(0) ≤ 0, see [37,
Lemma 2.2]) then the optimal policy is to pay all initial surplus x as a dividend immedi-
ately for all x; if xb ∈ (0,∞), then the solution is as in Proposition 2.6; if xb =∞ then no
optimal policy exists, but the optimal value function can be obtained by considering the
value function for a reflection dividend policy at a barrier b and then sending b→∞, i.e.
U(x) =
g(x)
limb→∞ g′(b)
. (2.8)
Let us explain some of the notationused in the present paper: As used above the derivative
of a one-dimensional function f(·) is denoted by f ′(·). This notation is also used for the
derivative of a multi-dimensional function with respect to the first variable in case it
is separated from the other variables with a semi-colon; otherwise the derivative with
respect to, say x, is indicated by a subindex x. By way of example, J ′(x;x, x¯) is the
derivative of J(x;x, x¯) with respect to x while Ax(x, y) is the derivative of A(x, y) with
respect to x. We also use the general notation f(x+) := limyցx f(y) and f(x−) :=
limyրx f(y).
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3. Precommitment solution
Wedefine the precommitment interpretationof the constrained optimal dividend problem
as
V (x0) = sup
S∈A(x0,k)
J(x0, S), where x0 > 0 is arbitrary but fixed. (3.1)
The solution to problem (3.1) is presented in Theorem 3.4. Our approach to this con-
strained problem relies on the Lagrangian idea. If we add the constraint as a penalty term
with Lagrange-parameter λ, the unconstrained optimization problem reads as
J(x0, S)− λ
(
R(x0, S)−
1
k
)
= Ex0

 ∑
n:τn≤τ
e−rτnζn

− λ

Ex0

 ∑
n:τn≤τ
e−rτn

− 1
k


= Ex0

 ∑
n:τn≤τ
e−rτn(ζn − λ)

− λ
k
.
We thus see a natural connection to the well-studied dividend problem in the case a fixed
cost c > 0 is incurred each time a dividend is paid. Therefore, it is not surprising that our
treatment relies on properties of the fixed cost dividend problem; which in the present
setting corresponds to
sup
S∈A(x)
H(x; c, S), where c > 0 and
H(x; c, S) : = Ex

 ∑
n:τn≤τ
e−rτn(ζn − c)


(= J(x;S)− cR(x;S)) .
(3.2)
In the case of a constant lump sum dividend barrier policy (x, x¯) we write the function
H(x; c, S) asH(x; c, x, x¯) and note that
H(x; c, x, x¯) =
{
g(x) x¯−x−c
g(x¯)−g(x) , 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯,
x− x− c+ g(x) x¯−x−c
g(x¯)−g(x) , x > x¯.
(3.3)
The solution to problem (3.2) is presented in Proposition 3.1 below; which follows directly
from [37, Theorem 2.1 and Remark 2.2(e)] together with Lemma 2.2 (another reference is
[5, Theorem 2.3 and Remark 2.4]); see also Remark 3.9. Recall that (A.1)–(A.5) are assumed
throughout the paper.
Proposition 3.1. For any fixed c > 0, a constant lump sum dividend barrier policy inde-
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pendent of x is optimal in (3.2). In particular:
(i) If the (smooth fit) equation system
H ′(x¯−; c, x, x¯) = 1, H ′(x; c, x, x¯) = 1, x > 0, (3.4)
has a solution, denoted by (xc, x¯c), then it is unique and it is also an optimal constant
lump sum dividend barrier policy, i.e.
sup
S∈A(x)
H(x; c, S) = H(x; c, xc, x¯c), for all x ≥ 0.
(ii) If (3.4) does not have a solution then the (smooth fit) equation
H ′(x¯−; c, 0, x¯) = 1, (3.5)
has a unique solution, denoted by x¯c, and the constant lump sum dividend barrier
policy (xc, x¯c) = (0, x¯c) is optimal, i.e.
sup
S∈A(x)
H(x; c, S) = H(x; c, 0, x¯c), for all x ≥ 0.
Proposition 3.2 below presents properties of the solution to problem (3.2) which we rely
on when proving the main results of the present section Theorem 3.4 and Corollary 3.7.
Most of these properties have been established before, if not exactly for the problem (3.2)
and setting of the present paper then for similar problems, see Remark 3.10.
Proposition 3.2. The optimal policy in Proposition 3.1 has the following properties:
0 ≤ xc < x
∗ < x¯c (3.6)
x¯c is continous and increasing in c; xc is continous and decreasing in c (3.7)
xc, x¯c → x
∗ > 0 as cց 0 (3.8)
H(x; c, xc, x¯c)→ U(x) as cց 0, for any x ≥ 0 (3.9)
x¯c > c and (hence) x¯c →∞ as c→∞ (3.10)
there exists a c¯ > 0 such that if c ≥ c¯ then (xc, x¯c) is a ruin policy, i.e. xc = 0 (3.11)
(recall that x∗ and U(x) correspond to the solution to problem (1.2), cf. Proposition 2.6).
We also need the following result.
Lemma 3.3. For any fixed initial surplus x0 > 0 there exists a unique constant c(x0, k) > 0
(depending on x0 and k) such that R(x0;xc, x¯c) ≥
1
k
for c ≤ c(x0, k) and R(x0;xc, x¯c) ≤
1
k
for c ≥ c(x0, k); where we recall that (xc, x¯c) is determined in Proposition 3.1. In partic-
ular,
R
(
x0;xc(x0,k), x¯c(x0,k)
)
=
1
k
. (3.12)
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Let the constant lump sum dividend barrier policy determined by Proposition 3.1 using
the cost c(x0, k) be denoted by (
˜
xk, x˜k), i.e. let
(
˜
xk, x˜k) :=
(
xc(x0,k), x¯c(x0,k)
)
. (3.13)
Theorem 3.4 (Precommitment solution). For any fixed initial surplus x0 > 0 the con-
stant lump sum dividend barrier policy (
˜
xk, x˜k) defined in (3.13) is optimal in (3.1) and the
corresponding optimal precommitment value is
V (x0) =
{
x˜k−
˜
xk
k
, 0 ≤ x0 ≤ x˜k,
x0 −
˜
xk +
g(
˜
xk)
g(x0)
x˜k−
˜
xk
k
, x0 > x˜k.
(3.14)
Proof. (of Theorem 3.4) Using e.g. Proposition 2.4 it is easy to verify that the right side
of (3.14) is equal to J (x0;
˜
xk, x˜k), i.e. the value obtained when using the constant lump
sum dividend barrier policy (
˜
xk, x˜k), and the second statement therefore follows from
the first statement.
Note that (
˜
xk, x˜k) ∈ A(x0; k) by (3.12)–(3.13). Consider an arbitrary fixed dividend pol-
icy S¯ = (τn, ζn)n≥1 ∈ A(x0, k). Using c(x0, k) > 0 (Lemma 3.3) and the constraint (MC)
we obtain
J(x0; S¯) ≤ J(x0; S¯)− c(x0, k)
(
R(x0; S¯)−
1
k
)
= Ex0

 ∑
n:τn≤τ
e−rτn (ζn − c(x0, k))

+ c(x0, k)1
k
.
Now use Proposition 3.1 and (3.3) to see that
sup
S∈A(x0)
Ex0

 ∑
n:τn≤τ
e−rτn (ζn − c(x0, k))


= H
(
x0; c(x0, k), xc(x0,k), x¯c(x0,k)
)
= J
(
x0;xc(x0,k), x¯c(x0,k)
)
− c(x0, k)R
(
x0;xc(x0,k), x¯c(x0,k)
)
.
Hence, using Lemma 3.3 again we obtain
J(x0; S¯) ≤ J
(
x0;xc(x0,k), x¯c(x0,k)
)
− c(x0, k)R
(
x0;xc(x0,k), x¯c(x0,k)
)
+ c(x0, k)
1
k
= J
(
x0;xc(x0,k), x¯c(x0,k)
)
.
Remark 3.5. The barrier x˜k and the dividend x˜k −
˜
xk in the optimal policy for problem
(3.1), see Theorem 3.4, depend on the initial surplus x0 and it is therefore clear that the
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optimal dividend policy (
˜
xk, x˜k) chosen at time 0 will not generally be optimal at a time
t > 0when the constraint (MC) is updatedwith the value for the state process observed at
t, and that the problem of the present paper is in this sense time-inconsistent. We remark
that Figure 3 in Section 5 illustrates how the precommitment value V (x0) depends on x0
in a specific example. We remark that this inconsistency has to do with the discounted
reward criterion considered here. If we instead consider the (economically perhaps not
too meaningful) long term average criterion
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
Ex (DT )
with corresponding constraint
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
Ex

 ∑
n:τn≤T
1

[= lim sup
T→∞
1
T
Ex|{n : τn ≤ T}|
]
≤
1
k
,
then the solution to the problem will become independent of the initial state x due to the
ergodicity of the situation. We refer to [21] for the treatment of a problem of this type in
portfolio optimization.
Remark 3.6. Consider an arbitrary fixed initial surplus x0 > 0. Relying on e.g. Lemma
2.5(i), Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.4 it is easy to see that the optimal precommitment policy
(
˜
xk, x˜k) can be determined as follows:
• Pick a cost c1 > 0.
• Determine (numerically)
(
xc1 , x¯c1
)
according to Proposition 3.1.
• If R
(
x0;xc1 , x¯c1
)
> 1
k
, we know that c1 is too low, i.e. c1 < c(x0, k), and we set
c1 = c
l
1 and choose a new c2 > c
l
1. If R
(
x0;xc1 , x¯c1
)
< 1
k
then we know that c1 is
too high, i.e. c1 > c(x0, k), and we set c1 = c
h
1 and choose a new c2 < c
h
1 .
• Iterate the steps above always choosing (using e.g. the bisection method) cn+1
larger than all cli, i ≤ n and smaller than all c
h
i , i ≤ n until you find a c which
attains (3.12) i.e. with R (x0;xc, x¯c) =
1
k
; now set (
˜
xk, x˜k) = (xc, x¯c), then this is
the optimal precommitment policy given the initial surplus x0.
We remark that more numerically efficient methods to find the optimal precommitment
policy are of course likely to exist.
The following result follows directly from Lemma 2.5(i), Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 3.3:
Corollary 3.7. For any fixed initial surplus x0 > 0 the precommitment solution (
˜
xk, x˜k)
in Theorem 3.4 has the following properties:
0 ≤
˜
xk < x
∗ < x˜k
x˜k is continous and increasing in k;
˜
xk is continous and decreasing in k
˜
xk, x˜k → x
∗ as k → 0
V (x0)→ U(x0) as k → 0
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x˜k →∞ as k →∞
there exists a k¯ > 0 such that if k ≥ k¯ then (
˜
xk, x˜k) is a ruin policy, i.e.
˜
xk = 0.
Remark 3.8. Themain interpretations of Corollary 3.7 are: (1) relaxing the constraint (MC)
in the sense of sending k → 0 implies that the optimal precommitment solution for the
constrained problem (3.1) converges monotonically to the solution of the unconstrained
problem (1.2), cf. Proposition 2.6, and (2) if the constraint is sufficiently restrictive, i.e. if
k is sufficiently large, then a ruin policy is optimal.
Remark 3.9. In [37] problem (3.2) is solved under essentially (A.1)–(A.2) and (A.3’). Under
these less restrictive assumptions it may be that neither case (i) nor case (ii) in Proposition
3.1 hold; and in this case, according to [37, Theorem 2.1], it holds that no optimal policy
exists, but the optimal value function can be obtained by considering the value function
for a reflection dividend policy at a barrier b and then sending b→∞, as in (2.8).
Remark 3.10. Properties (3.6) and (3.7) are in a setting similar to that of the present paper
established in [37, p. 675]. Property (3.8) is established in [29, Remark 2] for a model
based on a Wiener process with drift.
4. Time-consistent solution
Let us start by defining the notions of a pure dividend strategy and a (pure subgame
perfect Nash) equilibrium. These definitions are motivated in Section 4.1, which also
contains a discussion of the results in this section.
Definition 4.1. An impulse control policy S = (τn, ζn)n≥1, see (1.3), is said to be a pure
Markov dividend strategy profile if it for each x ≥ 0 holds that:
• Each dividend date is an exit time from a setW ⊆ [0,∞) that is open in [0,∞), i.e.
τ1 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ W}, τn = inf{t > τn−1 : Xt /∈ W}, n = 2, 3...
• Each dividend is given by ζn = ζ(Xτn), for some measurable function ζ(·) satisfy-
ing x− ζ(x) ∈ {0} ∪W for all x /∈ W .
From now on we refer to a pure Markov dividend strategy profile as a pure dividend
strategy.
Definition 4.2 (Equilibrium). A pure dividend strategy Sˆ is said to be a (pure subgame
perfect Nash) equilibrium if for all x > 0:
Sˆ ∈ A(x, k), (EqI)
for the processX satisfying (1.1) withDt = 0 for all t ≥ 0 it holds that
lim inf
hց0
J
(
x; Sˆ
)
− Ex
(
e−rτhJ
(
Xτh ; Sˆ
))
Ex (τh)
≥ 0,
(EqII)
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for all y ∈ [0, x]: if R
(
y; Sˆ
)
≤ 1
k
− 1 then J
(
x; Sˆ
)
≥ J
(
y; Sˆ
)
+ x− y. (EqIII)
Moreover, J
(
·; Sˆ
)
is said to be the equilibrium value function (corresponding to Sˆ).
Remark 4.3. If k > 1 then the only strategy that satisfies (EqI) for each x is to never pay
dividends; and it is easy to see that this is the unique equilibrium in this case.
With the remark above in mind we assume in the rest of this section that
k ≤ 1. (A.6)
Recall also that (A.1)–(A.5) are assumed throughout the paper. We need the following
result.
Lemma 4.4.
(i) The equation system
R (x¯;x, x¯) =
1
k
(4.2)
J ′ (x¯−;x, x¯) = 1 (4.3)
has a unique solution (x, x¯), for which it holds that 0 ≤ x < x∗ < x¯. Moreover, if
k = 1 then x = 0 and if k < 1 then x > 0.
(ii) Let (x, x¯) be the unique solution to (4.2)–(4.3). Then, x¯ is determined by the (smooth
fit) equation
J ′
(
x¯−; x¯− k
g(x¯)
g′(x¯)
, x¯
)
= 1, (4.4)
and
x = x¯− k
g(x¯)
g′(x¯)
. (4.5)
(iii) Equation (4.4) simplifies to
g
(
x¯− k
g(x¯)
g′(x¯)
)
= (1− k)g(x¯). (4.6)
Theorem 4.5 (Time-consistent solution).
(i) The constant lump sum dividend barrier strategy (
ˆ
xk, xˆk), where xˆk is determined by
the (smooth fit) equation (4.4) and
ˆ
xk = xˆk − k
g(xˆk)
g′(xˆk)
, is an equilibrium.
(ii) The equilibrium value function is given by
J(x;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) =
{
g(x)
g′(xˆk)
, 0 ≤ x ≤ xˆk,
x−
ˆ
xk +
g(
ˆ
xk)
g′(xˆk)
, x > xˆk.
(4.7)
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Proof. (of Theorem 4.5) Item (ii) follows from (i), Proposition 2.4 and Lemma 4.4. Let
us prove (i): Condition (EqI) (in Definition 4.2) is directly verified for each x using that
(
ˆ
xk, xˆk) satisfies (4.2) and
ˆ
xk ≥ 0 (Lemma 4.4). By Lemma 4.4 holds
J ′ (xˆk−;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) = (J
0)′ (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) = J
′ (xˆk+;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) = 1.
Using e.g. (2.4), (2.6) and Lemma 2.2 it is easy to verify that
(AX − r)J
0 (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) = 0, and (J
0)′′ (x;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) ≥ 0 for x ≥ x
∗.
Recall that xˆk > x
∗ (Lemma 4.4) and that r > 0. Using the above and also µ′(x)− r ≤ 0
(Assumption 2.1) we find that for any x > xˆk it holds that
µ(x)− r (x− xˆk + J (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk))
≤ µ (xˆk)− rJ (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)
< µ (xˆk) (J
0)′ (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) +
1
2
σ2 (xˆk) (J
0)′′ (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)− rJ (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)
= (AX − r)J
0 (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) = 0.
Using the observations above and (2.4) we obtain
(AX − r)J (x;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) =
{
0, 0 ≤ x < xˆk,
µ(x)− r
(
x−
ˆ
xk + J
0 (
ˆ
xk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)
)
, x > xˆk,
=
{
0, 0 ≤ x < xˆk,
µ(x)− r
(
x− xˆk + J
0 (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)
)
, x > xˆk,
≤ 0.
Using also a generalized Itô formula, see e.g. [41, Section 3.5], we find that the numerator
in (EqII) satisfies
J (x;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)− Ex
(
e−rτhJ (Xτh ;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)
)
= −Ex
(∫ τh
0
I{Xs 6=xˆk}e
−rs (AX − r)J (Xs;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) ds
)
≥ 0, for any h > 0 and any x > 0.
This implies that (EqII) holds for each x. Use thatR (xˆk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) =
1
k
,R (
ˆ
xk;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)+1 =
1
k
and R (y;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) is increasing in y to see that
R (y;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) ≤
1
k
− 1⇒ y ≤
ˆ
xk. (4.8)
Let K(x) := J (x;
ˆ
xk, xˆk) − x. It is easy to verify that K(0) = 0, K(
ˆ
xk) = K(xˆk),
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K ′(xˆk) = 0, K
′′(x) < 0 for x < x∗ and K ′′(x) > 0 for x > x∗. Using also that
ˆ
xk < x
∗ < xˆk it is easy to see thatK(·) is increasing on [0,
ˆ
xk) and that
if 0 ≤ y ≤
ˆ
xk and x ≥ y then:
K(x)−K(y) = J (x;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)− x− (J (y;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)− y) ≥ 0.
(4.9)
From (4.8) and (4.9) it follows that (EqIII) holds.
Remark 4.6. The equilibrium (
ˆ
xk, xˆk) can be found as follows. First, find the unique solu-
tion to (4.6) and set xˆk equal to this solution. This ensures that the smooth fit equilibrium
condition (4.4) is satisfied. Second, set
ˆ
xk = xˆk − k
g(xˆk)
g′(xˆk)
.
The following definition corresponds to an adaptation of the notion of a strong equilib-
rium, see Section 4.1 for a motivation. Note that a strong equilibrium is necessarily an
equilibrium in the sense of Definition 4.2.
Definition 4.7 (Strong equilibrium). An equilibrium Sˆ is strong if condition (EqII) in
Definition 4.1 can be replaced by:
for the processX satisfying (1.1) withDt = 0 for all t ≥ 0 there exists
an h¯ > 0 s.t. J
(
x; Sˆ
)
≥ Ex
(
e−rτhJ
(
Xτh ; Sˆ
))
, for all h ∈ [0, h¯].
(EqII’)
It is easy to see that the arguments that imply that condition (EqII) holds in the proof of
Theorem 4.5 also imply that the stronger condition (EqII’) holds and we therefore obtain:
Theorem 4.8. The equilibrium (
ˆ
xk, xˆk) in Theorem 4.5 is strong.
We also find:
Theorem 4.9. The equilibrium (
ˆ
xk, xˆk) in Theorem 4.5 has the following properties:
0 ≤
ˆ
xk < x
∗ < xˆk (4.11)
xˆk is continous and increasing in k;
ˆ
xk is continous and decreasing in k (4.12)
ˆ
xk, xˆk → x
∗ as k → 0 (4.13)
J (x;
ˆ
xk, xˆk)→ U(x) as k → 0, for any x ≥ 0 (4.14)
the equilibrium is a ruin strategy, i.e.
ˆ
xk = 0, if and only if k = 1. (4.15)
4.1. Motivation of equilibrium definition and discussion
The maximization of the value function J(x;S) in (2.3) under the constraint (MC) is
time-inconsistent in the sense that the optimal policy depends on x, see Remark 3.5. The
game-theoretic approach is to suppose that the decision maker, or controller, in a time-
inconsistent problem is a personwith time-inconsistent preferences and to reinterpret the
problem as an intrapersonal sequential dynamic game. For the problem of the present
paper this means identifying each x ∈ (0,∞) with an agent, called the x-agent, who
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decides if, and ofwhich size, a dividend should be paid if the current value of the processX
is x; and letting all x-agents play a sequential dynamic game against each other regarding
how to pay dividends from the surplus processX . (We remark that similar interpretations
for regular time-inconsistent stochastic control can be found in e.g. [12, 13, 31], and in
[19, 20] for time-inconsistent stopping.) The interpretation of Definition 4.1 is therefore
that each x-agent must make his decision at x without randomization and only based
the current value x and in this sense it is clear that Definition 4.1 corresponds to a pure
Markov strategy profile. (Recall that, in general, a pure Markov strategy depends only
on past events that are payoff relevant and determines the action of an agent without
randomization and that a strategy profile is a complete specification of the strategies of
every agent in a game.)
The items in Definitions 4.2 and 4.7 have the following interpretations:
• Condition (EqI) ensures that an equilibrium Sˆ is admissible from the viewpoint of
every x-agent. In particular, the constraint (MC) is, from the view-point of every
x-agent, satisfied.
• Condition (EqII) is an adaptation of the usual first order equilibrium condition in
time-inconsistent stochastic control, studied for a general model in continuous time
in [12]. The interpretation of (EqII) is that an x-agent’s criterion for not deviating
from Sˆ by not paying a dividend at x when Sˆ prescribes paying a dividend at x is
that the instantaneous expected discounted rate of change relative to Ex(τh) ob-
tained by deviating is non-positive. In line with [12, Remark 3.5] and [20, Section
2.1] we remark that this kind of first-order equilibrium may correspond to a sta-
tionary point that is not a maximum in the sense that the numerator in (EqII) can
be negative for each fixed h > 0 and still be in line with (EqII) by vanishing with
order o(Ex(τh)). Clearly, it is not entirely satisfactory in every situation that an
equilibrium may correspond to a stationary point that is not a maximum in this
sense. With an observation of this kind as a motivation the notion of a strong equi-
librium was, in a time-inconsistent stochastic control framework, defined in [28].
(EqII’) is an adaptation of this notion to the problem of the present paper and the
interpretation is, based on the discussion above, obvious.
• Condition (EqIII) means that if it is for an x-agent admissible to pay a dividend, then
the action prescribed for the x-agent by Sˆ is more desirable, from the viewpoint of
that x-agent, than paying any (alternative) admissible divided.
A conclusion of Theorem 4.9 is that the equilibrium solution for the constrained problem
converges monotonically to the optimal solution for the unconstrained problemwhen the
constraint (MC) vanishes in the sense of sending k → 0. It is clearly desirable that an
equilibrium solution is optimal in the absence of time-inconsistency and the just men-
tioned fact thus further supports our equilibrium definition.
Equation (4.4) can be said to be a smooth fit equilibrium condition. We remark that a
smooth fit equilibrium condition for a time-inconsistent stopping problem was found in
[20].
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5. An example
In this section we suppose that the uncontrolled surplus process is a Wiener process with
positive drift, and let µ > 0 and σ > 0 denote the its drift and volatility, respectively.
Using elementary calculations, see e.g. [42, Section 5], we find the canonical solution of
(2.1)–(2.2) to be
g(x) = eα1x − eα2x
where α1 := −
µ
σ2
+
√
µ2
σ4
+ 2r
σ2
and α2 := −
µ
σ2
−
√
µ2
σ4
+ 2r
σ2
.
It is now easy, cf. (2.6), to verify that
x∗ =
log(α22/α
2
1)
α1 − α2
∈ (0,∞).
In all illustrations in this section we use the parameter values µ = 0.06, σ2 = 0.03 and
r = 0.02. This implies that x∗ = 1.1405. The strict concavity-convexity of g(·), in the
sense of Lemma 2.2(iv), is illustrated in Figure 1.
0 1 2 3
0
1
2
3
x
g
(x
)
Figure 1 The canonical solution of (2.1)–(2.2) corresponding to a Wiener process with positive
drift.
Let us first see how the optimal precommitment policy (
˜
xk, x˜k) for an arbitrary fixed
initial surplus x0 > 0 is found. First, use (3.3) to find
H(x; c, x, x¯) =
{
(eα1x − eα2x) x¯−x−c
eα1x¯−eα2x¯−eα1x+eα2x
, 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯,
x− x− c+ (eα1x − eα2x) x¯−x−c
eα1x¯−eα2x¯−eα1x+eα2x
, x > x¯.
This implies that (3.4) is satisfied if
(α1e
α1x¯ − α2e
α2x¯)
x¯− x− c
eα1x¯ − eα2x¯ − eα1x + eα2x
= 1, (5.1)
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(α1e
α1x − α2e
α2x)
x¯− x− c
eα1x¯ − eα2x¯ − eα1x + eα2x
= 1, for x > 0, (5.2)
and that (3.5) is satisfied if
(α1e
α1x¯ − α2e
α2x¯)
x¯− c
eα1x¯ − eα2x¯
= 1. (5.3)
Second, we similarly obtain
R(x0;x, x¯) =
{
eα1x0−eα2x0
eα1x¯−eα2x¯−eα1x+eα2x
, 0 ≤ x0 ≤ x¯,
1 + e
α1x−eα2x
eα1x¯−eα2x¯−eα1x+eα2x
, x0 > x¯.
(5.4)
In order to find the optimal precommitment policy (
˜
xk, x˜k) we now consider some con-
stant c1 > 0 and determine
(
xc1 , x¯c1
)
as the solution to the dividend problem with fixed
cost c1 according to Proposition 3.1. This means that we let
(
xc1 , x¯c1
)
be the solution to
(5.1)–(5.2) if it exists and if it does not then we set
(
xc1 , x¯c1
)
= (0, x¯c1) where x¯c1 is the
solution to (5.3). An illustration is presented in Figure 2.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
c = 0.1 c = 0.6
c = 2.0
x
H
(x
;c
,x
c
,x¯
c
)
Figure 2 The optimal value function of the fixed cost dividend problem, see (3.2), for c = 0.1,
c = 0.6 and c = 2.0 for which the optimal dividend policy is (0.7670, 1.8528),
(0.5453, 2.9769) and (0.3183, 4.9580), respectively. The dashed lines indicate smooth
fit.
We now evaluate the function in (5.4) with (x, x¯) =
(
xc1 , x¯c1
)
and then iterate this proce-
dure with higher or lower costs in accordance with Remark 3.6 until we find a cost c such
that (5.4) evaluated at (xc, x¯c) is equal to
1
k
; which then means that (
˜
xk, x˜k) = (xc, x¯c)
for the particular initial surplus x0 at hand. An illustration of the precommitment value
as a function of x0 is presented in Figure 3.
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0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
1
2
3
k = 0.4
k = 0.8
x0
V
(x
0
)
Figure 3 The precommitment value, see (3.14), as a function of x0 for k = 0.4 and k = 0.8.
Let us now find the equilibrium dividend strategy (
ˆ
xk, xˆk). In the rest of the section we
suppose that k ≤ 1, cf. Remark 4.3. First, note that (4.6) becomes
e
α1
(
x¯−k e
α1x¯−e
α2x¯
α1e
α1x¯−α2e
α2x¯
)
− e
α2
(
x¯−k e
α1x¯−e
α2x¯
α1e
α1x¯−α2e
α2x¯
)
= (1− k)
(
eα1x¯ − eα2x¯
)
. (5.5)
Following Remark 4.6 we now: (1) ensure that the equilibrium smooth fit condition (4.4)
holds by solving (5.5) and setting xˆk equal to this solution, and (2) set
ˆ
xk = xˆk − k
g(xˆk)
g′(xˆk)
= xˆk − k
eα1xˆk − eα2xˆk
α1eα1xˆk − α2eα2xˆk
.
An illustration of the equilibrium value function and the equilibrium smooth fit principle
is presented in Figure 4.
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
3
4 k = 0.01 k = 0.50
k = 0.99
x
J
(x
; ˆx
k
,xˆ
k
)
Figure 4 The equilibrium value function, see (4.7), for k = 0.01, k = 0.5 and k = 0.99,
for which the equilibrium dividend strategy is (1.1206, 1.1507), (0.3757, 1.9893) and
(0.0059, 3.2056), respectively. The dashed lines indicate smooth fit.
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5.1. Sensitivity with respect to k and c
A natural question when studying impulse control problems is what happens for vanish-
ing fixed costs, in particular what happens to the derivative of the optimal value function.
To the best of our knowledge, such an analysis has not been carried out for exactly the
optimal dividend problem (3.2). However, slightly different problems without absorption
are studied in [34], and the references therein, and it is investigated what happens when
the fixed cost c is sent to zero, see also [2, 18, 35]. One main finding is that while the value
of the problem converges to the one without fixed costs as c ց 0 (as in Proposition 3.2)
the derivative with respect to c converges to −∞. The interpretation is that small fixed
costs have large effects on the value. Figure 5 illustrates these properties for the optimal
dividend problem (3.2). (In this sectionwe consider a fixed initial surplus x = x0 = 0.025.
The dashed line in each graph below indicates the optimal value without costs, see (2.7),
while the dotted line is the optimal dividend barrier without costs, see (2.6).)
In contrast to the findings for small fixed costs c, Figures 6 and 7 suggest that small values
of k in our constraint (MC) just have small effects on the value for both the precommit-
ment and the equilibrium formulation. To not overburden the present paper, we leave the
theoretical investigation of these findings for future research.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
c
su
p
S
∈
A
(x
)
H
(x
;c
,S
)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
x¯c
xc
c
Figure 5 The first graph illustrates the value for the fixed cost dividend problem as a function of
c. The second graph illustrates the corresponding dividend policy as a function of c.
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.2326
0.2327
0.2328
0.2329
k
V
(x
0
)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
1.1
1.15
1.2
˜
xk
x˜k
k
Figure 6 The first graph illustrates the optimal precommitment value as a function of k. The
second graph illustrates the corresponding dividend policy as a function of k.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
k
J
(x
; ˆx
k
,xˆ
k
)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0.5
1
1.5
2
ˆ
xk
xˆk
k
Figure 7 The first graph illustrates the equilibrium value as a function of k. The second graph
illustrates the corresponding dividend strategy as a function of k.
A. Model discussion
(A.1)–(A.2) are standard assumptions that guarantee the existence of a smooth canonical
solution to (2.1)–(2.2) and a strong (unique) solution to (1.1). Adding (A.3)–(A.5) guaran-
tees that the canonical solution g(·) has the properties of Lemma 2.2(ii)–(iv) which are all
important ingredients in several of the proofs underlying the main results of the present
paper; in particular, the strict concavity-convexity property of g(·), in the sense of Lemma
2.2(iv), is crucial.
The fixed cost dividend problem problem (3.2) was in [37, Theorem 2.1] solved essentially
under (A.1)–(A.3’), i.e. under weaker assumptions than those of the present paper; see
Remark 3.9 for further details. A motivation of (A.3’) is provided in [37, Remark 2.1].
The fixed cost dividend problem is in [6, 7] studied under further relaxations of (A.3’).
We leave for future research how such relaxations can be related to the findings of the
present paper.
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If (A.5) does not hold, i.e,. if µ(0) ≤ 0, then the optimal policy in (the unconstrained)
problem (1.2) is to pay all initial surplus x as a dividend immediately, see [42, Theorem
4.3]. Hence, in this case the optimal solution does not violate the constraint (MC) (assum-
ing that k ≤ 1, cf. Remark 4.3); and the constrained dividend problem is in this case not
time-inconsistent and there is thus no need to investigate this case along the lines of the
present paper.
B. Proofs
Proof. (of Lemma 2.2.) First note that (A.1) implies that |µ(x)| + |σ(x)| ≤ K(1 + x) for
all x ≥ 0 and some K > 0. A reference for the existence of a unique canonical solution
satisfying (i) can be found on [37, p.671]. Now use g(0) = 0, g′(0) > 0 and [42, Lemma
4.2 (a)] to see that (ii) holds; let us however remark that we can replace (A.3) with the
relaxed assumption (A.3’) (see page 7) and still (ii) holds.
Item (iii) follows from [5, Proposition 2.5]; also here (A.3) can be replaced with (A.3’).
From [37, Lemma 2.2] and (A.1)–(A.3) (also here (A.3) can be replaced with (A.3’)) it fol-
lows that there exists a point xb ∈ [0,∞] such that g(·) is concave on [0, xb) and convex
on [xb,∞). (A.5) implies that xb > 0, see [37, Lemma 2.2]. Clearly (iii) implies that
xb <∞. It directly follows that g
′′(xb) = 0. Now, by (2.1), it is easy to find that
g′′′(x) = 2
r − µ′(x)
σ2(x)
g′(x)− 2
µ(x) + 12(σ
2(x))′
σ2(x)
g′′(x).
Hence, relying on (A.1)–(A.3) we apply [42, Lemma 4.1] to g′(·) and obtain (iv); we remark
that a similar argument is made in the proof of [42, Lemma 4.2].
Proof. (of Proposition 2.4.) The claims can be proved using the usual arguments involving
the strong Markov property, Itô’s formula, and that J(x;x, x¯) and R(x;x, x¯) satisfy the
ODE in (2.1) for 0 < x < x¯ and the boundary conditions
J(0;x, x¯) = 0, J(x;x, x¯) = J(x;x, x¯) + x− x for x ≥ x¯,
R(0;x, x¯) = 0, R(x;x, x¯) = R(x;x, x¯) + 1 for x ≥ x¯.
Proof. (of Lemma 2.5.) The claims can be verified using (2.5), Lemma 2.2 (which e.g. im-
plies that limx→∞ g(x) =∞) and x¯ > x ≥ 0.
Proof. (of Proposition 3.2.) Use (3.3) to see thatH(x¯c; c, xc, x¯c) > 0 and hence x¯c − xc −
c > 0. Moreover, H(x¯c; c, xc, x¯c) −H(xc; c, xc, x¯c) = x¯c − xc − c > 0. Using also that
xc ≥ 0 we find that (3.10) holds.
Suppose a function f : R→ R satisfies
• f ′(y) = f ′(y¯) = 1 for some 0 ≤ y < y¯, and
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• f ′′(y) < 0 for y ∈ (0, y∗) and f ′′(y) > 0 for y ∈ (y∗,∞) for some y∗ > 0,
then it directly follows that 0 ≤ y < y∗ < y¯. Note that Lemma 2.2 implies that g(·)
satisfies the second item above with y∗ = x∗ (recall that x∗ := xb). It follows, cf. (3.3),
that H(·; c, xc, x¯c) satisfies the second item above; moreover, H(·; c, xc, x¯c) satisfies the
first item above (with xc = y and x¯c = y¯) within case (i) (of Proposition 3.1). Hence, (3.6)
holds in case (i). It can be similarly shown that (3.6) holds in case (ii).
Consider case (ii). From (3.6) and (3.10) we know that x¯c > x
∗, c. Hence, using also (3.3)
and (3.5), we see that x¯c is the unique solution to the equation
A(x¯, c) := g′(x¯)(x¯− c)− g(x¯) = 0, x¯ > x∗, c. (B.1)
Note that Ax¯(x¯, c) = g
′′(x¯)(x¯ − c) > 0 and Ac(x¯, c) = −g
′(x¯) < 0 for all x¯ > x∗, c
(Lemma 2.2). Hence, by the implicit function theorem, x¯c = x¯c(c) for a function x¯c(·)
satisfying
x¯′c(c) = −
Ac(x¯c, c)
Ax¯(x¯c, c)
=
g′(x¯c)
g′′(x¯c)(x¯c − c)
> 0.
It follows that x¯c is (strictly) increasing and continous in c within case (ii). In case (i) it
similarly holds that (xc, x¯c) is the unique solution to the equation system
B(x, x¯, c) := g′(x)(x¯− x− c)− g(x¯) + g(x) = 0
C(x, x¯, c) := g′(x¯)(x¯ − x− c)− g(x¯) + g(x) = 0
for x¯ > x∗, c and x∗ > x > 0.
(B.2)
Note that, for all x¯ > x∗, c and x∗ > x > 0,
• Bx(x, x¯, c) = g
′′(x)(x¯− x− c) < 0,
• Bx¯(x, x¯, c) = Cx(x, x¯, c) = g
′(x)− g′(x¯),
• Bc(x, x¯, c) = −g
′(x) < 0,
• Cx¯(x, x¯, c) = g
′′(x¯)(x¯ − x− c) > 0,
• Cc(x, x¯, c) = −g
′(x¯) < 0.
The Jacobian matrix of (x, x¯) 7→ (B(x, x¯, c), C(x, x¯, c))T (where T denotes transpose),
cf. (B.2), is (
g′′(x)(x¯− x− c) g′(x)− g′(x¯)
g′(x)− g′(x¯) g′′(x¯)(x¯− x− c)
)
,
and hence its determinant is
g′′(x¯)g′′(x)(x¯− x− c)2 − (g′(x)− g′(x¯))2 < 0,
where we used that g′′(x) < 0 and g′′(x¯) > 0 (to see this use x > x∗ > x¯ and Lemma 2.2).
The Jacobian matrix is therefore invertible. Note that g′(xc) = g
′(x¯c), cf. (B.2), and use
the implicit function theorem to see that (xc, x¯c) = (xc, x¯c)(c) for a function (xc, x¯c)(·)
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satisfying
(
d
dc
(xc, x¯c)(c)
)T
= −
(
g′′(xc)(x¯c − xc − c) 0
0 g′′(x¯c)(x¯c − xc − c)
)−1(
−g′(xc)
−g′(x¯c)
)
=
1
g′′(x¯c)g′′(xc)(x¯c − xc − c)
2
(
g′′(x¯c)(x¯c − xc − c)g
′(xc)
g′′(xc)(x¯c − xc − c)g
′(x¯c)
)
=
(
g′(x
c
)
g′′(x
c
)(x
c
−x¯c−c)
g′(x¯c)
g′′(x¯c)(xc−x¯c−c)
)
.
Hence, xc is (strictly) decreasing and continous in c while x¯c is (strictly) increasing and
continous in c within case (i). Using the observations above it is easy to see that if the
following statements,
(1) there exists a c¯ which is such that if c < c¯ then we are in case (i) and if
c ≥ c¯, then we are in case (ii), and (2) (xc, x¯c)(c)→ (0, (x¯c)(c¯)) as cր c¯,
(B.3)
hold, then (3.7) holds, and so does (3.11). Recall that (xc, x¯c) is the unique solution to (B.2)
in case (i); but this is equivalent to
g′(xc) = g
′(x¯c) =
g(x¯c)− g(xc)
x¯c − xc − c
(
>
g(x¯c)− g(xc)
x¯c − xc
)
. (B.4)
Similarly, in case (ii) note that (B.1) is equivalent to
g′(xc) =
g(x¯c)
x¯c − c
(
=
g(x¯c)− g(0)
x¯c − 0− c
>
g(x¯c)− g(0)
x¯c − 0
)
. (B.5)
Note that (B.4) means that, for any c, the derivatives g′(xc) = g
′(x¯c) strictly dominate
the slope of a line between the points (xc, g(xc)) and (x¯c, g(x¯c)) and that the difference
between these derivatives and the slope is strictly decreasing in c. A similar observation
can be made for (B.5). Using the observations above and recalling that g(·) is strictly
concave on (0, x∗) and strictly convex on (x∗,∞) it is easy to see that (B.3) holds, which
thus implies that (3.7) and (3.11) hold; and moreover that
g′(xc) = g
′(x¯c) =
g(x¯c)− g(xc)
x¯c − xc − c
→ g′(x∗) as cց 0,
and
xc ր x
∗ and x¯c ց x
∗ as cց 0.
It thus also follows that (3.8) and (3.9) hold (to see this use also e.g. (2.7) and (3.3)).
Proof. (of Lemma 3.3.) The claims can be verified using Lemma 2.5(i) and properties of
the function c 7→ (xc, x¯c) corresponding to Proposition 3.2.
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Proof. (of Lemma 4.4.) Proposition 2.4 and the fact that the functions in (4.2)–(4.3) are
defined only for x > x¯ ≥ 0 are used throughout the proof.
Let us prove (i): Suppose k = 1. It is easy to see that (4.2) holds if and only if x = 0.
Using this and (4.3) it is easy to see that the claim holds if and only if the equation
A(x¯) := g′(x¯)x¯− g(x¯) = 0
has exactly one solution in (0,∞) and this solution is strictly larger than x∗. To see that
this the case it suffices to note that:
• limx¯ց0A(x¯) = A(0) = 0 and limx¯→∞A(x¯) =∞.
• A′(x¯) = g′′(x¯)x¯ which, by Lemma 2.2, means that A′(x¯) < 0 for x¯ ∈ (0, x∗) and
A′(x¯) > 0 for x¯ > x∗.
Now suppose k < 1 (recall that k > 0, see (MC)). It follows from (4.2) that x > 0.
Recalling that x¯ > x ≥ 0 by definition it is easy to see that (4.3) holds if and only if
g′(x¯) =
g(x¯)− g(x)
x¯− x
. (B.6)
Now recall from Lemma 2.2 that g′′(x) < 0 if x ∈ (0, x∗) and g′′(x) > 0 if x ∈ (x∗,∞),
and limx→∞ g
′(x) =∞, from which it is easy to see that:
• If x ≥ x∗ then no x¯ > x such that (B.6) holds exists.
• If x < x∗ then a unique x¯ > x such that (B.6) holds exists, and x¯ > x∗.
• There exists a continous strictly decreasing function
x¯(·) (B.7)
such that (B.6) holds if and only if x¯ = x¯(x) for any a fixed x ∈ (0, x∗), where
x¯(x) > x∗. Moreover, sending xր x∗ implies that x¯(x)ց x∗.
From the observations above and properties of the function x¯ 7→ R(x¯;x, x¯) (Lemma 2.5)
it follows that the following schedule gives a unique solution to (4.2)–(4.3) in the case
k < 1:
• Pick a x1 ∈ (0, x
∗).
• Determine x¯1 = x¯(x1) by verifying (B.6) (which implies that (4.3) holds).
• If R (x¯1;x1, x¯1) >
1
k
then we know that x1 is too high and x¯1 is too low (cf. that
x¯(·) is decreasing) to be a solution to (4.2), and we set x1 = x
h
1 and choose a new
x2 < x
h
1 . Analogously, if R (x¯1;x1, x¯1) <
1
k
then we know that x1 is too low and
we set x1 = x
l
1 and choose a new x2 > x
l
1.
• Iterate the steps above always choosing (using e.g. the bisection method) xn+1
smaller than all xhi , i ≤ n and larger than all x
l
i, i ≤ n until you find an x such that,
with x¯ = x¯(x), it holds that R (x¯;x, x¯) = 1
k
(which by Lemma 2.5 is possible).
Note that this schedule can easily be modified in order to find the solution to (4.2)–(4.3)
in the case k = 1, using that in this case (4.2) holds if and only if x = 0.
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Let us now prove (ii): It is easy to verify that (4.2) holds if and only if (x, x¯) is a solution
to the equation
g(x) = (1− k)g(x¯). (B.8)
Inserting (B.8) into (B.6) yields (4.5) and inserting (4.5) into (B.8) yields
g
(
x¯− k
g(x¯)
g′(x¯)
)
− (1− k)g(x¯) = 0.
The claim can now be verified using (2.4). Item (iii) follows from (2.4).
Proof. (of Theorem 4.9.) Recall that (
ˆ
xk, xˆk) solves (4.2)–(4.3). Hence, using Lemma 4.4
we obtain (4.11). To see that (4.13) and (4.14) hold recall the properties of the function (B.7)
and adapt the arguments after (B.7) in the obvious way, recalling also (B.6) and properties
of the function x¯ 7→ R(x¯;x, x¯) (Lemma 2.5). Item (4.12) is proved similarly. Item (4.15)
follows from Theorem 4.5 and Lemma 4.4.
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